[Sim84] introduced th e concept of subliminal channel in the contezt of signature systems.
1 Introduct ion [Sim84] found that a secret message can be hidden in a subliminal way through the authentication process. Simmons called the hidden channel the subliminal channel Simmons illustrated it, by comparing it with two prisoners who are communicating authenticated messages in full view of a warden. The warden is able to read the messages. The subliminal consists in hiding a message through the authentication scheme such that the warden cannot detect its use nor read the hidden part (for other subliminal channels see [JS86, Sim85, Sim86] ).
[Des88b] demonstrated that subliminal-free authentication and signature systems can be made by introducing the concept of active warden (a warden who modifies the authenticator).
[DesSSa] studied subliminal channels in different contexts (which was then called abuses). iDes88 a 's solutions against abuses are exhaustive, discussing ] particular solutions to particular problems. The goal of this paper is to prove, in a constructive way, that all cryptosystems can be made abuse-free using a compiler which will transform a given cryptosystem into an abuse-free version (similarly as [GMW86, p. 1851, but keeping the solution practical). However, our solution could ruin the security specifications, in other words, it could be that the abuse-free version is no longer a secure cryptosystem. Therefore, we can only prove our theorem for a family of cryptosystems.
7
2 Formal model for abuses and abuse-freeness
We assume that the reader is familiar with terminology of [GMRSS] (will be briefly overviewed in final paper) and notations in [CEvdGP87] . We now introduce a formal description of an active and a passive warden, covering'them together to avoid longwindedness. The model has similarities with the one in [BOGKW88] . an S(L)-system with (active or passive) warden, W , or shorter an S-system if there is no ambiguity. We will also say that the m-participant system B is S-secure.
Definition 2 allows us to speak about authentication-system, signature-systems and so on. For our purposes, we now adapt notations introduced in [GMRBg] . For a run of A, an m-participant system, with x on the shared common tape (C) and with hl on Al's private read-only tape, the l-participant's view corresponds with all that can be seen from his random tape and from the read-only communication tapes Ri,j (for all j E (1,. . . , l -1, l + 1,. . , , m + 1)). Let PviewA,I(z, hl) be the random variable whose value is the I-participant's view, If the warden, W , is an active one, we define the warden's view to be everything that can be seen from W's random tape and from all read only communication tapes R:,j, for i # j. If the warden is passive, and x is on the shared common tape (C), we define the warden's view to be everything that can be seen from all read only communication tapes, Rij (i # j ) . WviewA(z) is the random variable whose value is the warden's view. To simplify notations, we did not specify the input h,+l in the expression WviewA(z). 
Informal interpretation
In an abuse, the passive warden, W , is listening to all communications going on during the run of the system. However, the passive warden, W , has no access to the tapes Hi. The subliminal receiver k is waiting to receive hidden information and is therefore running his special program A; instead of running the normal one, namely Ak.
Abuse-freeness means that one does not exclude that a different system is used than the one intended, but the warden will detect it (almost always). Strong abusefreeness means that a polynomial-bounded warden will (almost always) detect an abuse even if the other participants have all infinite computer power.
A general solution

A BUILDING BLOCK
Let us first discuss a slightly modified version of [Des88a] abuse-free generation of public keys (the main difference is that W will always publish the public key). In the final paper we will formally define what a public-key generation system is SO considering [GMR88, pp. 290-2911's definition. 
Proof.
First observe that such a zero-knowledge protocol exists, because what has to be proven is an N P problem [GMW86] . (The fact that the zero-knowledge aspect in [GMW86] is based on unproven assumptions does not influence our proof, because its soundness is unconditional.)
Let us call the public-key generation system, which is presented in Figure 1, A = ( A (A, B, W ) . Observe that {Pview~,A;,~(z, h2)} = {Pview~,2(x, h 2 ) } because B is not sending and thus not influencing. We w i l l prove more than required; which is that there exists a poly-size family of circuits C such that if {WviewA(z)} and {WviewAr(z)} are C-computationally indistinguishable then, {PviewA,Z(z, h,)} and { P v~~w A , ,~( z , h2)} are statistically indistinguishable on L".
Consider the circuit which the warden will use to check the zero-knowledge proof. Let the circuit return a 1 if the warden accepts the proof and a 0 otherwise. For this particular circuit, saying that {WviewA(z)} and {WviewA,(z)} are C-computational indistinguishable means that for all constants e > 0 and all sufficiently long strings z E L: Ip(warden rejects) -$(warden rejects)I < 1z1-=, where $(warden rejects) and p'(warden rejects) denote respectively the probability that the warden will reject (the proof) when A and A' is executed. (A correct proof is not necessarily accepted with probability one, due to the definition of completeness, which is important for noninteractive proofs.) PviewAt,Z(z, hz) is nothing else than n sent by W and the probability that a specific n; is sent is denoted as $(n = n;). Similarly p(n = n;) corresponds to the probability that B receives n; when A is executed.
Using our reformulations, it is sufficient to prove that if (1) holds for all e > 0 and all sufficiently long z E L , then (2) holds for all d > 0 and all sufficiently long z E L.
We first describe how n is made. First A' makes a string m, not necessarily as specified. So there is a probability that A' returns a specific rn E {O,l}*. Then W gives a r' E G. Given this r' and his previous information, A' will make an n. n does not necessarily correspond with f(s). Similarly, A' will make a proof, but nothing guarantees that this proof is correct. We will denote the string (At's random, r', U ) as a, where c is the string of W's questions in the zereknowledge protocol when it is interactive, and when the zero-knowledge proof system is non-interactive, u cone sponds with the shared common random string [BFM88] . The string(s) that A' sends during the zero-knowledge proof is(are) denoted as 7. So:
Remark that p ( a = a,) remains the same independently if A or A' is executed (and independent of hz).
Let us denote p'(X = 1) the probability that machine A' will return at one or another stage of the protocol something different than it should have returned when it would have followed the protocol. We then prove that:
C I p ( n = n ; ) -p ' ( n = n ; ) l I : 2p'(A=1).
Let us denote $(warden rejects) as p'(p = 1). The problem remaining now is to relate $(A = 1) with p'(p = 1) and then to finally prove the theorem.
We prove that:
Assuming (l), this means # ( p = 1) < lzl-" for all e > 0 and 5 large enough, and using the definition of completeness and soundness we obtain that for all t > 0 and sufficiently large x: $(A = 1) < IzI-'. Then follows that if (1) holds for all e > 0 and all sufficiently long z E L , then ( 2 ) holds for all d > 0 and all sufficiently long z E L.
0
We have used the symbol @ for a visualization aid in case G = GF(2"), but the group G does not have to be Abelian.
O U R SOLUTION
Let us first introduce a special case of a sequential multi-participant system. (What we describe can be run in parallel under some circumstances, but our definition of a multi-participant system requires an order in which the machines write on their communication tapes.)
Definition 5 Let A be a sequential rn-participant system with passive warden W . Let us call t the input of the common input tape, h; and qfi the content of respectively the private tape H; and the read-only communication tape I&; at stage s. The binary string ri contains the string read by A; during the protocol from the random tape. We assume that the length of hi, qQ and r; and the number of stages (this last requirement could be relaxed) are polynomial in function of the length of z. q:i could be empty.
During stage s, A%(*) writes n, on tape Tx(,),4(,). If ~( s ) # 1 ( I fixed), then n, E R Gz,.
Or n, = fs(z, d ( s ) , 1 7 qr(r),27 1 * 9 qr(s),m7 1 * . * 7 qr(a),lY S-1 qn(s),27 8-1 * * * 7 qw,(a),m), #-' such that:
the form of n, is known beforehand in a deterministic way, 0 Vx,s : G,,,(+) forms a group, such that in polynomial-time (in function of the length of z) one can: execute the operations +, check if z E G,,,, and select a random element of G,,*, the functions f, are executable in polynomial time. If A satisfies all the described properties here; we call A a generalized Arthur-Merlin game, with A1 being Merlin [Bab85].
Observe that if A, is not Merlin its output is either truly random or a deterministic function of its inputs, so in the last case the random tape is not used. We would like to prove now that all S(L)-systems which are generalized Arthur-Merlin games can be made abuse-free. However, our solution could ruin its (security) specifications; therefore we can only prove a restricted form of it, which is based on a repetitive use of Theorem 1. We claim that most practical, conditionally secure cryptosystems can be made abuse-free if one allows interaction with the warden. Giving a proof of this claim is impossible due to a lack of an adequate formal description of all possible cryptosystems.
Corollary 1 If A is a genemlized Arthur-Merlin game and an S(L)-system, then there exists a multi-participant system A' (with active warden), such that either:
A' is an unconditionally strong abuse-free S(L)-system, or 0 A' isn't an S(L)-system. Proof. Our proof will be constructive by describing the multi-participant system A'. A generalized Arthur-Merlin game can be considered to be a system which is mainly publishing public. keys, random numbers and/or deterministic calculations.
In an initial stage, A; sends W a commitment (ml = c(rl,kl)) for the bit string ri.
If r(4 = 1, then Af sends n, = f*(z, r m ; , h, Q.?J, n: , z, -* -* Q l , W . -, Ql,l 7 942 ? . -9 Ql,, 1 Let us now prove that A' is abuse-free. It holds that VA" : {PviewAt,,q,;(z, hi)} and {PViewAl,;(z, h ; ) ) are equal, when i # I; due to the independency of the warden's random choices. Also VA" : {PviewAj*A;,l(z, hl)} and {PviewAll,,(s, hl)} are equal.
This implies that the rest of the proof follows easily from the proof of Theorem 1 (because the remark made after (3) is still valid).
Let us discuss some improvements. Sometimes, it is sufficient for the warden to check once and for all (or at the beginning of the protocol) that hl satisfies the appropriate predicates. Instead of rl being modified at the beginning of the protocol, it could be done during the different stages of the protocol. It is then necessary to guarantee independency of randomness when appropriate and to treat earlier altered random as deterministic variables instead of random ones. If a function fa is deterministic, it means rl is not used, then there is no need for interaction if Ai's zero-knowledge proof is non-interactive. a We make the important observation that all the unconditionally abuse-free cryptosystems discussed in [Des88a, Des88b] are generalized Arthur-Merlin games and therefore special cases of ours and that therefore the proof of their abuse-freeness has not to be given for each separately.
Let us discuss the consequences of Corollary 1 by analyzing which cryptosystems can be made abuse-free. One first has to realize that, so far, most cryptosystems have been defined without taking a (passive) warden into consideration. So first, one has to convert them into a definition in which the warden's role and privileges are defined. Mostly, one considers such a warden as an opponent. In particular the above corollary also implies (after a careful redefinition, as mentioned) that abuse-free interactive proof systems and zero-knowledge systems for N P languages ezist, using GoldreichMicali-Wigderson [GMW86] proof for 3-colourability and Corollary 1, however the verifier's soundness collapses to a conditional soundness, instead of an unconditional one. It is possible to make abuse-free zero-knowledge proofs for all languages in NP such that the soundness of the verifier remains unconditional, as was recently demonstrated [BD89]. This solution is however not based on the above compiler. The protocol described in [Des88a] to make zero-knowledge proof systems for NP languages abuse-free is only conditionally abuse-free, while the one here is unconditional.
Conclusions and open problems
Our approach to abuse-freeness allows one to make all (generalized Arthur-Merlin games) cryptosystems abuse-free. It is an open problem of whether Corollary 1 can be generalized to more general multi-participant systems (excluding the obvious generalizations). If so, a different proof technique will be necessary.
Trying to apply Corollary 1 on unconditionally secure authentication systems as e.g., [GMS74] , ruins the unconditionality of the authentication. The question whether it can be solved in one or another way is an open problem, even if the abuse-freeness would only be weak abuse-freeness (as defined). A similar remark was made related to soundness of zero-knowledge schemes, there also the unconitionality of the soundness was ruined by using above compiler. For zero-knowledge, the same problem could be solved [BD89] , but the solution is not based on the above compiler. The approach followed in this paper is constructive as well as general. It avoids the exhaustive character followed in [Des88a] but gives a global solution to the problem, useful for many situations. One of the advantages of this approach is the reduction of proofs required to demonstrate the abuse-freeness of different cryptosystems to mainly one proof.
